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I. The statute is clear and unambiguous, and must be interpreted as written: 
In February, 1996 the Appellant, then 19 years old, plead guilty to a violation of Idaho 
Code Section 18-1507 A. Idaho Code Section 18-8304, which enumerates the crimes requiring 
sex offender registration, does not list Idaho Code Section 18-1507 A as art offense requiring 
registration. That statute was repealed in 2012 and simultaneously struck from Section 8304. 
Effective July 1, 2012, Mr. Hauser was no longer required to register under the SORA. 
"When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words of the statute, and 
where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court gives effect to the statute as 
written, without engaging in statutory construction." Boyd-Davis v. Maccomher Law, PLLC., 
157 Idaho 949, 952 (2015). 
The Court below, and the State on appeal, argues that this is an "absurd" result, 
contending that Section 1507A, even though repealed, survives within Section 1507 and that Mr. 
Hauser is still subject to the SORA. This violates the first principle of statutory construction, is 
not supported by a review of the legislation, and is contrary to the format of Section 8304. 
The repeal of Section 1507 A, and its elimination from Section 8304, was enacted by the 
2012 legislature. 2012 Sess. Laws ch. 269 (effective July 1, 2012) (Senate Bill 1337]. In its 
Statement of Purpose, the only pertinent references to Section 18-1507 A and Section 8304 are as 
follows: "REPEALING SECTION 18-1507 A, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO POSSESSION 
OF SEXUALLY EXPLOITATIVE MATERIAL FOR OTHER THAN A COMMERCIAL 
PURPOSE; AMENDING SECTION 18-8304, IDAHO CODE, TO REMOVE A CODE 
REFERENCE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION .... " The legislative history of 
SB 1337, at least the legislative history counsel was able to find, does not even mention, let alone 
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discuss or debate, Section 1507 A and its repeal, nor, more importantly, the decision to strike 
Section 18-1507 A from Section 8304. 
The format of Section 8304 also dictates that the result argued by the State be rejected. 
The legislature, in enacting Section 8304, did not list the offense by a "name", or by a generic 
group, such as "rape, sodomy, lewd conduct with a minor child, sexual exploitation of a minor 
child, or possession of child pornography." The legislature in enacting Section 8304, listed the 
offense by specific reference to the Idaho Code. The State would have the Court re-write Section 
8304, by concluding that Section 1507A, even though repealed and now stricken from Section 
8304, has now somehow been incorporated into Section 1507 as an offense to be known as 
"possession of child pornography". This would constitute judicial legislation, and not within the 
power or role of the Court under out constitutional system of government. 
The statute is plain and unambiguous. If the legislature intended for registration for 
those formally convicted under Section 1507 A to continue, it could have simply repealed the 
statute without striking it from Section 8304. It did not do so, and Appellant's obligation to 
register under the Act ended with the enactment of Chapter 269 of the 2012 legislature. 
II. The term "victim" is defined under Idaho law, not the law of other jurisdictions: 
The term "victim" is defined by Idaho law, not federal law or the law of other states. Our 
Constitution directed the legislature to define victim (IDAHO CONST., Art. I, Section 22. The 
legislature did so in Section 19-5306(5)(a). A victim is an "individual who suffers direct or 
threatened physical, financial or emotional harm as the result of the commission of a crime or 
juvenile offense." State v. Hansen, 156 Idaho 169, 174 (2014). Thus, there is no need to consult 
federal law or the law of other jurisdictions to define the term. 
-2-
The term is further limited by the context and focus of the inquiry. Was the offense the 
Appellant plead guilty to an "aggravated offense" under Idaho Code Section 18-8303 because "at 
the time of the commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen .... "? 
The Information the Defendant admitted to did not identify, by name or initial, nor by 
age, any victim. A child can be anyone under the age of 18, and that was the only factual 
allegation in the charge. The only support for the trial Court's finding was the assertion from the 
State that "some" of the images appeared to be of children under 13. None were ever identified, 
either by name or initial. There was no evidence that anyone had suffered "direct harm as a 
result of the commission of [the] crime." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,575 (2008). Absent 
such evidence, the Court erred in concluding this was an "aggravated offense." 
III. The State is not entitled to attorney's fees on appeal: 
"As a general rule, attorney fees are not awarded on appeal except pursuant to 'a statute 
or contractual provision authorizing an award of attorney fees on appeal. Ticor Title Co. v. 
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 127 (2007)." International Real Estate Solutions, Inc., v. Arave, 157 
Idaho 816,822 (2014). 
The statute advanced by the State is Idaho Code Section 12-117 (2015 Supp.), which 
requires the State be the "prevailing party" and also requires a finding that the "non prevailing 
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Whether the State will be the prevailing party or not will have to await the Court's 
decision, but the law and facts of this case, and the argument advanced by Appellant, preclude a 
finding that he "acted without a reasonable basis in fact of law." The State's request for attorney 
fees should therefore be denied. 
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Dated this day of September, 2015. 
Certificate of Service 
THOMAS M. VASSUER 
Attorney for Appellant 
I hereby certify that on the / &day of September, 2015, two copies of the foregoing were 
served upon counsel for Respondent by mailing the same, postage pre-paid, to Cherly A. 
Emmons-Meade, Deputy Attorney General, Idaho State Police, 700 S. Stratford Dr., Meridian, 
ID 83642. 
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